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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we propose a simple post-Keynesian model on the linkages between the financial and 
real side of an economy. We show how, according to the Minskyan instability hypothesis, financial 
variables, credit availability and asset prices in particular, may feedback each other and affect 
economic activity, possibly giving rise to intrinsically unstable economic processes. Through these 
destabilizing mechanisms, we also explain why governments intervention in the aftermath of the 
2007 financial meltdown has been largely useless to restore financial tranquility and economic 
growth, but transformed a private debt crisis into a sovereign debt one. The paper ends up by 
looking at the long run and to the interaction between long-term growth potential and public debt 
sustainability. We explicitly consider the European economic context and the difficulties several EU 
members currently face to simultaneously support economic recovery and consolidate fiscal 
imbalances. We stress that: (i) financial turbulences may trigger permanent reductions in long-term 
growth potential and unsustainable public debt dynamics; (ii) strong institutional discontinuity 
such as EU financial assistance to member countries may prove to be the only way to restore 
growth and ensure long-run public debt sustainability. 
 
Keywords: post-Keynesian models, financial instability, debt sustainability, Eurobonds. 
JEL code: E12, E44, H63           
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
From mid 2007 on, the sub-prime crisis has brought back to the center of common people 
and government thoughts economic problems such as deep and prolonged economic 
recession, widespread and rising unemployment, increasing life uncertainties. It was from 
1929 Great Depression that these problems were not perceived as so urgent as they are today.  
Since then, governments and monetary institutions of almost all developed and developing 
countries have been engaged in financial system rescue programs aiming to re-establish the 
normal functioning of financial markets and of the overall economy. In the meanwhile, the 
initial financial crisis has turned into a confidence crisis on the sustainability of public debt 
stocks. As a consequence, even if economic recovery still lacks or decelerates in most 
economies, the initial support to anti-cyclical measures has been replaced by the insistent call 
for restrictive fiscal policies and the rapid obtainment of public account equilibrium. In a 
pretty short time span, the alleged return to Keynesian policies have been forgotten; very 
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standard IMF-type adjustment programs have come back to dominate economic theory and 
policy practice. This is particularly true in Europe, where the so-called PIIGS countries, i.e. 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, find themselves stuck in a hurry to implement tight 
fiscal corrections to assure financial markets about public finance solidity.   
In this paper, we aim at analyzing some of the economic forces leading to the present 
gloomy worldwide economic context. First, we want to enlighten some perhaps relevant 
mechanisms connecting the financial side to the real side of an economy, possibly showing 
how financial variables, let’s say available credit and financial asset prices, may heavily 
influence economic performances. Second, we try to provide a formal description of the 
Minskian financial instability hypothesis, i.e. to analytically describe destabilizing processes 
that seem to naturally characterize nowadays financial systems. We emphasize the hard job 
economic policy institutions have to undertake to stabilize financial markets and show why 
public intervention after the 2007 sub-prime crisis have proved largely useless to re-establish 
financial order and eventually resulted in sovereign debt crises. Finally, we look at the long 
run and try to see how long-run growth potential and public debt evolution interact each 
other. In this sense, we explicitly take into account the European case insofar as we try to 
evaluate the usefulness of the EU member state rescue fund and of Eurobond issuances to 
support EU member countries efforts against financial instability and in favor of economic 
recovery. 
We address the above topics by developing a simple post-Keynesian model. Our task is not 
to elaborate a complex stock-flow-consistent (SFC) analytical framework. In a sense, our goal 
is much more modest and narrower. It ends up in the formal description of a strict bunch of 
mechanisms at the base of the recent financial instability and of the ensuing economic 
downturn. Even though our work is based on a different methodology with respect to SFC 
models, it shares the same theoretical background. The present work heavily draws 
inspiration from some previous post-Keynesian contributions. Two articles from Lavoie 
(2006) and Fontana and Setterfield (2009), in particular, are the starting points on which to 
build up the present model. 
According to Lavoie (2006) and to the post-Keynesian perspective on money (Bertocco, 
2006 and 2009), we embrace the endogenous money theory. We model Central Bank behavior 
as setting discount rate on the base of a well-known Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), while base 
money creation ultimately emerges from effective credit demand (Bertocco, 2009). With 
respect to the Lavoie 2006 model, we explicitly consider the role of financial operators, 
commercial banks in particular, and formally represent an effective credit demand function. 
Whilst these last points are already present in Fontana and Setterfield (2009), we try to go a 
step further by endogenizing the operational behavior of financial institutions and not to 
represent them as constant parametric aspects of the model. On the contrary, we describe 
their endogenous adjustments as potential sources of financial instability. Finally, following 
Lavoie (2006), we end up by looking at long-run issues such as the dynamics of potential 
growth. We integrate previous Lavoie analysis by considering the interaction between long-
run growth potential and the evolution of public debt stock. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple post-Keynesian short-run 
macro model on connections between the financial system and the real side of an economy. 
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Section 3 models the Minsky-type financial instability hypothesis and the effectiveness of 
government policies in the aftermath of the 2007 sub-prime crisis. Section 4 extends the 
analysis to the long run and to the interplay between long-term growth potential and public 
debt sustainability, in the European Union in particular. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A simple post-Keynesian macro model 
             
There is general consensus among economists, both from a mainstream perspective and 
from an heterodox approach, as to the behavior of  monetary authorities. Using Romer (2000) 
own words, we can convincingly affirm that Central Banks, rather than pursuing money 
aggregate targets, now “follow a real interest rate rule; that is, they act to make the real 
interest rate behave in a certain way as a function of macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation and output (Romer, 2000, p. 154)”. To this end, they (Central Banks) “focus on the 
interest rate on loans between banks in their short-run policy-making (and) use the nominal 
interbank rate as their short-term instrument (Romer, 2000, p. 155)”.  
From an analytical standpoint, such a behavior of monetary authorities is generally 
modeled through the well-known Taylor rule, which makes Central Banks’ discount rate a 
function of some inflation and output targets (or, better, of the discrepancies between current 
inflation and economic performance with respect to their own corresponding targets). In this 
regard, the present work does not introduce any exception. Following Lavoie (2006), we 
assume equation (1) below to model Central Bank monetary policy:        
  =  + 	 − 	 +  −                                                                                                                            (1) 
 
According to equation (1), Central Bank sets the discount rate icb on loans to financial 
institutions, commercial banks mostly, by taking into account several factors. First, Central 
Bank discount rate is a positive function of the gap between current inflation rate π and the 
inflation target πT. Second, the discount rate icb also changes on the base of the existing output 
gap, here modeled as the difference between current economic growth g and potential growth 
gn. In question (1), Parameters α and β stand for the sensitivity of the Central Bank reaction 
function to the inflation target and output target respectively. Finally, parameter i0 stands for 
a sort of Wickselian long-run interest rate set by Central Bank once both the inflation and 
output target are met.      
Central Bank decisions influence financial operator credit policies. According to the 
endogenous money theory, here we assume financial operators, commercial banks in 
particular, to set the interest rate iL on loans by applying a mark-up rate m on the discount 
rate from the Central Bank. This is stated in equation (2). Equation (3), in turn, gives the 
“effective” or “credit-worthy” demand for loans LP from private actors which will be accepted 
by financial institutions at the ruling interest rate iL.    
  = 1 +                                                                                                                                                           (2)                                  
  =  −  − 	                                                                                                                                         (3) 
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As usual, we assume the effective demand for credit as a negative function of the real 
interest rate, here stated as the difference between the nominal interest rate on bank loans iL 
and expected inflation πe. In equation (3), parameter γ represents all those factors, let’s say 
institutional factors independent from the interest rate, which influence economic agent 
access to credit. In this sense, note that, besides loans to non-financial institutions, households 
and firms basically, we include in LP also inter-banks credits. Actually, whilst these kind of 
credits are neglected in most economic models due to the difficulties to formally describe or 
account for them in stock-flow-consistent exercises, we consider such flows fundamental to 
explain the ongoing behavior of financial institutions and the ensuing effects on the real 
sphere of the economy. We finally stress that in this part of the model we maintain the 
traditional assumption of constant values of the parameters defining the functioning of 
financial systems, parameters γ and m in particular. Such an assumption will be abandoned 
later on, when we will formally describe the destabilizing processes that more frequently 
distress worldwide financial systems.  
Financial institutions do not provide credits to private actors only. They also finance public 
deficit in exchange of T-bonds. In equation (4), LG stands for total financial needs of domestic 
governments, which depend on two components: primary deficit ∆ and interest payments on 
the stock of accumulated debt D.   
  = Δ, ,  ,  +  = , ,  −   − 	 +                                                                                  (4) 
 
In equation (4), primary deficit ∆ obviously depends positively on government purchases G 
for both current expenditures and public investments, and negatively on taxation level T.  
Beside this, we also assume that policy makers may be induced to reduce primary deficit, and 
eventually run a surplus (i.e. in this paper a negative value of ∆), the higher is the prevailing 
interest rate iL or the higher is public debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y)=d.  
Last but not least, equation (5) below describes the current growth rate of the economic 
system g. According to Lavoie (2006), it may represent a sort of IS curve expressed in growth 
terms. Following Fontana and Setterfield (2009), we assume g to depend positively on the 
amount of loans given by financial institutions to private actors LP as well as on government 
primary deficit. Actually, the higher is financial support LP given to private economic agents, 
the higher will likely be consumption and investment expenditures and therefore demand 
injections stimulating economic growth. Secondly, easy financing of public financial needs 
may allowed governments to run larger primary deficits and thus to scale up those 
expenditures, let say public investments, which may have direct positive effects on growth 
performances g.    
  = ! , " = # + $ + %"                                                                                                                                     (5) 
 
From a mathematical point of view, substituting equations (3) and (4) in (5) and 
rearranging, it is easy to see the negative relationship that eventually links the prevailing 
interest rate iL to current economic growth g.  This is explicitly stated in equation (6): 
  = # + $ + %, ,  − $ + %  − 	 = , ,  − & − 	                                                (6) 
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With  = # + $ + %, ,  and & = $ + % . 
In the present model we have so far neglected inflation issues. As to price dynamics, let 
first assume that economic agents judge Central Bank behavior reliable and credible, so that 
πe = πT. Moreover, following Lavoie (2006), let assume that Central Bank is capable to 
properly set parameter i0 in order to meet the inflation target in the long run when current 
economic growth is equal to potential growth. Substituting equation (4) in (6), putting g=gn 
and replacing the result in (1), we get: 
  = '()'*+,-.,/+0                                                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
In the short run, current inflation may obviously depart from its targeted long-run value. In 
this paper, we describe inflation dynamics as depending on the inter-play between demand 
and supply forces. We model this point through equation (8) below: 
 	 − 	 = 1 −                                                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Equation (8) is a sort of short-run Philips curve. According to it, current inflation 
accelerates and it is higher than long-run target inflation should current economic growth be 
higher than potential growth. On the contrary, inflation decelerates and it is temporary lower 
than πT in case of current economic growth below potential. Parameter ψ stands for the 
sensitivity of current inflation to discrepancies between current economic growth and 
potential growth1. 
Above equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (8) form a system of 6 equations in 6 endogenous 
variables: icb, iL, LP, LG, π and g. Substituting equation (8) in (1), putting the result in (2) and 
then in (6), we can find a clear expression for economic growth in the short run: 
  = '(),2/+034()5+67'*)-.89/+,/+05+67                                                                                                                     (9) 
 
Equation (9) simply states that current economic growth is a positive function of g0, and 
therefore of government purchases G for both current expenditures and public investment. On 
the contrary, g reacts negatively to heavier taxation T and to a higher public debt/GDP ratio d, 
which may persuade domestic policy-makers to reduce primary deficits. Easy credit market 
conditions, as represented by a low value of the mark-up rate parameter m and a high value of 
the intercept parameter γ in the effective credit demand function (3) favor growth. The 
possibility for economic agents to have easy access to credit facilities may induce them to 
increase consumption expenditures as well as implement higher and more numerous 
investment plans, thus raising aggregate demand and eventually aggregate production. 
Finally, current economic growth increases the higher is growth potential gn and the less 
stringent is inflation target set by Central Bank (i.e. the higher is πT). 
                                                           
1 Equation (8) is logically equivalent to the description of inflation dynamics provided by Lavoie (2006). 
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3. The endogenous instability of financial systems. 
 
In the short-run model above we have assumed operating conditions of financial systems 
to be given. In particular, we have imagined constant values of both the mark-up rate m and of 
parameter γ in the effective credit demand function. This is a standard assumption in most 
heterodox models and it sounds reasonable in times of financial stability and tranquility. 
However, it surely appears too restrictive in periods of strong financial turbulences like those 
emerged from the outbreak of the 2007 subprime crisis and, more in general, at odds with the 
intrinsic instability dynamics that, from decades, seem to affect financial systems (Minsky, 
1989). Let us therefore depart a bit from the simple scenario introduced above and try to 
formally describe what Kregel (2007) defines as the “natural instability of financial markets”. 
According to Wray (2007), Brancaccio and Fontana (2010), several institutional changes 
and innovations have recently affected the functioning of financial systems. First of all, a long-
run process of deregulation has been implemented from the seventies on. Segmentations of 
financial markets have been removed and barriers between commercial banks, investment 
banks and other financial institutions became weaker and weaker. As a consequence, 
commercial banks have been increasingly involved in a much wider range of financial 
activities including participation to long-term and speculative financial markets. Investment 
banks and speculative agents have had the opportunity to access short-term borrowing. 
Secondly, a deep process of securitization of existing loans has taken place inducing a “create 
and distribute” practice to replace previous “create and hold” behavior of financial 
institutions. Complex structured financial instruments such as collateralized-debt-obligations 
(CDO) have widespread on financial markets and composed a growing part in the balance 
sheet of most financial institutions worldwide. 
While a favorable macroeconomic climate featuring low interest rates and easy money may 
perhaps have favored the diffusion of such financial innovations, deregulation and 
securitization processes themselves have probably contributed to expand credit and liquidity 
creation even further, to feed asset price booms, ultimately to set the conditions for instability 
to overtake financial systems2. Such destabilizing processes are formally described in 
equations (10) and (11) below. 
Let assume that parameters γ and m, even though constant in the short run, may be 
subjected to revision by financial operators in the medium run. Let assume, moreover, that 
such adjustments depend on the prices of assets in the balance sheet of financial institutions 
and on perceived overall financial risks. More in details, we have: 
         : = !;<;, =, < , >= = !, , < , >                                                                                          (10) 
With 
?@?A > 0, ?@?D > 0, ?@?E < 0 and ?D?A > 0 
                                                           
2 The expansion of mortgage markets, as due to the possibility of packaging and distributing worldwide 
conceded loans through collateralized debt obligations, undoubtedly played a leading role in feeding the US 
housing boom. High and growing house prices, in turn, have induced financial operators to assess CDO 
instruments as risk-free, thus raising their price and their diffusion in the balance sheet of financial institutions. 
Also due to the pro-cyclical mechanisms of the Basle II agreement, these facts have allowed to further expand 
credit facilities, to underestimate existing risks, to reduce prudential measures, ultimately to raise financial 
instability.       
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 : = G<, , < , > = G, , < , >                                                                                          (11) 
With 
?H?A < 0, ?H?D < 0, ?H?E > 0  
 
In equations (10) and (11), PP represents the average price of asset-backed securities, i.e. 
collateralized debt obligations, increasingly included in the balance sheet of most financial 
operators, commercial banks as well. In equation (10), increasing prices of asset-backed 
securities induce financial operators to upscale parameter γ, to reduce conditions set on 
credit demands and ultimately to expand loans. In equation (11), on the contrary, increasing 
PP values cause a downward adjustment and a reduction in the mark-up rate m charged on 
private loans. Moreover, following Kregel (2007)3, let assume PP to be a positive function of 
the total amount of loans LP given to private agents and fuelling mortgage markets, 
consumption credit facilities ect…ect. Easy credit to households, firms or other financial 
business activities may boost their consumption, investment and “speculative” decisions, 
increase the price of mobile and immobile assets, eventually raise the price PP of connected 
financial assets. On the base of this casual chain, it turns out to be clear that increasing values 
of γ feed back positively on its own adjustment process whilst tend to reduce m. On the 
contrary, higher m values may produce huge credit market contractions by leading to 
downward revise γ and further increase bank mark-up rate.  These mechanisms are clearly 
destabilizing. 
In equations (10) and (11), PG stands for the market price of T-bonds acquired by financial 
operators in order to meet government financial needs. Again, a positive and negative 
relationship connects PG to adjustments in parameters γ and m, respectively. Increasing T-
bond prices, for instance, by improving financial operators balance sheets, may induce credit 
institutions to expand the set of acceptable credit demands and, at the same time, to reduce 
profit margins on conceded loans. 
Finally, r represents a general indicator of risk and uncertainty as perceived by financial 
operators. In equations (10) and (11), we assume increasing risks and uncertainty, i.e. higher 
r values, to induce more conservative, prudent and restrictive credit policies. Parameter γ in 
the effective credit demand function would be easily cut and the mark-up rate m on loans 
increased.  
In order to assess the stability properties of the two-equation dynamic system above we 
have to compute the corresponding Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives in the neighborhood 
of the steady state. According to the analysis above, we get: 
 
J = K?@?L ?@?0?H?L ?H?0M  
 
                                                           
3 Kregel (2007) describes the feedback circular mechanism between expanding bank loans and growing real 
estate and asset prices at the base of the financial euphoria preceding and then causing the 1929 Stock Exchange 
crash. These mechanisms are pretty much similar to those emerged in the most recent episodes of financial 
crises.  
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Two possible scenarios arise. A locally unstable equilibrium exists if det.(J)>0 and Tr.(J)>0. 
Whilst the matrix trace is surely positive, given that Tr.(J) = N!/N + NG/N > 0, the first 
condition requires that N!/NNG/N − NG/NN!/N > 0, or, alternatively, − ?H/?0?H/?L > − ?@/?0?@/?L  , i.e. the locus for constant values of m is positively sloped and steeper than 
the locus for constant values of γ in the (m,γ) space. On the contrary, if the determinant of 
matrix J turns out to be negative, an unstable saddle-path dynamics emerges. Graphically, this 
would apply should the locus for constant values of γ be steeper than the locus for constant 
values of m in the (m,γ) space, i.e.  − ?H/?0?H/?L < − ?@/?0?@/?L . These two possibilities are graphically 
portrayed in charts 1 and 2 below: figure 1 reports the case for a locally unstable equilibrium 
and figure 2 represents the case for a saddle-path dynamics. 
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Figure 1 – Locally unstable dynamics on financial markets 
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Figure 2 – Saddle-path unstable dynamics on financial markets 
 
Perhaps more relevant than the technical aspects above, it is the intrinsic instability 
characterizing financial systems. Actually, financial systems are stable, i.e. they feature 
constant values of their own operational parameters γ and m, so long as they lie in the 
equilibrium point E. However, should any shock hit them, destabilizing mechanisms will be 
set in motion. Financial systems will easily give rise to either euphoric dynamics or financial 
collapses unless they would be moved, by chance, on the saddle-path bringing back to 
equilibrium (obviously, this possibility applies in case of figure 2 only). In point A, for 
instance, a process of irrational euphoria may take place. First, financial operators will tend to 
cut profit margins on loans and make credit cheaper. Second, effective credit demand will 
expand thanks to lower credit conditionalities, let’s say the introduction of low-doc or no-doc 
procedures on mortgage market. As a result, credit flows increase hugely and liquidity floods 
financial markets. Asset prices likely increase giving rise to a new round of expansion of credit 
in an apparently endless process. In point B, on the contrary, all the conditions for a credit 
crunch are at work. Increasing mark-up rates on loans make interest rates increase 
vigorously. At the same time, credit conditionality becomes tighter and tighter. Credit lines 
are cut and credit market dried. Asset prices decrease, exacerbating capital losses in financial 
operators balance sheets and further search for liquidity. Without the strong intervention of 
public authorities, credit markets would probably stop to work at all4. 
Even worse, there are concrete possibilities that credit booms eventually set the conditions 
for subsequent contractions and leave the stage to credit crunches5. Actually, following Wray 
                                                           
4 According to Brancaccio and Fontana (2011), this is what happened in July 2007, when French Bank BNP 
Paribas stopped to reimburse some of its institutional funds due to exposure to US sub-prime obligations, and, 
even worse, in September 2008 after the failure of Lehman Brothers Investment bank. These events induced 
interest rates to tremendously skyrocket on inter-bank credit markets and a dramatic halt in credit operations.   
5 According to Minsky itself, “there is, in the financial stability hypothesis, a theory of how a capitalist economy 
endogenously generates a financial structure which is susceptible to financial crises, and how the normal 
functioning of financial markets in the resulting boom economy trigger a financial crisis (Minsky, 1982, p.68)”. 
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(2007), financial markets euphoria is usually associated to increasing leverage and risky 
positions6. Even if increasing risks may be temporally blurred by the complex technicalities of 
new financial instruments7, soon or later they will emerge and be incorporated in financial 
operator decisions. In this model, according to equations (10) and (11), abrupt revisions in 
perceived systemic risks will provoke immediate increases in the mark-up rate on loans and a 
marked tightening of credit conditionality. Graphically, according to figure 3 below, both locus 
for constant values of m and γ will move upward, passing from : = 0 and : = 0 to /: = 0 and /: = 0, respectively. A credit boom, like that represented in point A, may be 
suddenly transformed in mounting financial markets distress. 
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Figure 3 – Credit booms, increasing financial risks and the outbreak of financial crises 
 
It goes without saying that the outbreak of financial crises may have disruptive 
consequences on the real side of the economy. According to the short-run analysis above, 
whilst credit booms favor real economy expansions, the contraction of the effective credit 
demand and increasing mark-up rate on loans and therefore higher interest rate simply cut 
growth and possibly induce economic recessions with the ensuing social costs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6 Randal Wray, in describing the mechanisms at the base of the 2007 sub-prime crisis, clearly states that 
“(financial) innovations expanded the supply of loans, fueled homebuying and drove up the value of real estate, 
which increased the size of loans required and justified rising leverage ratios […] the combination of low interest 
rates and rising real estate prices encouraged a speculative frenzy (Wray, 2007, p. 11)”. Ultimately, “the current 
crisis is a natural outcome of these processes – an unsustainable explosion of real estate prices, mortgage debt 
and leverage positions in collateralized securities (Wray, 2007, p. 2)”  
7 See again Brancaccio and Fontana (2011) on the apparently risk-reducing composition techniques 
characterizing asset-backed securities. Actually, in 2007, close to the 60 percent of new structured finance 
instruments got a triple A rating, i.e. the highest level of security.  
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3.1 Effectiveness of financial systems rescue programs and the ongoing sovereign debts 
crisis 
 
“The most significant economic event of the era since World War II is something that has 
not happened: there has not been a deep and long-lasting depression (Minsky, 1982, 
introduction)”. In 1982, Minsky used these words to express the capability of economic policy 
institutions to tame destabilizing financial processes and to maintain economies in 
equilibrium. According to Minsky, this was possible thanks to an institutional arrangement 
featuring a “Big Government”, i.e. government authorities maintaining pretty stable economic 
dynamics and profit levels through expansionary fiscal stances and budget deficits, and a “Big 
Bank”, i.e. Central Banks recurrently acting as lenders of last resort of a widening range of 
financial operators.  
Something similar seems to have been in place since 2007. Actually, most governments 
worldwide have been involved into costly programs to rescue financial systems from failure 
and, in a lesser extent, to stimulate economic recovery. Several banks and financial 
institutions have been de-facto nationalized. At the same time, Central Banks have strongly 
reduced discount rates and provided extraordinary credit facilities to financial operators. 
Three years later the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, however, there is a mounting debate on 
the effectiveness of these policies and institutional arrangements. Actually, several economic 
institutions now are compellingly asking for a fast departures from alleged expansionary 
Keynesian policies and for a quick implementation of restrictive deficit/debt reducing fiscal 
policies (IMF, 2010; European Commission, 2010)8. Proposals go as far ahead as to demand 
the introduction of a zero-deficit commitment into countries’ constitutional papers. 
Before analyzing some aspects of this debate, a conceptual premise is needed. Although the 
expansionary and deficit spending fiscal policies cited above are generally labeled as 
Keynesian, most of them actually are not. Financial system rescue packages, even though 
attempting to re-establish the normal functioning of financial markets and hence of the 
economy as a whole, do not directly provide demand injections counteracting the economic 
downturn. According to the European Commission (2009), public help to financial institutions 
was in the range of 5-10 percent of GDP in several member countries. According to a report of 
the Bank for International Settlements published in July 2009, numbers are extraordinary 
higher in countries like UK, where outlays have amounted to something like the 44 percent of 
national GDP. By mid 2009, on the contrary, discretional fiscal stimuli to economic recovery 
reached 1,8 percent of EU-27 GDP only. Typical anti-cyclical Keynesian measures such as huge 
public investment programs have been largely neglected with respect to other initiatives 
(European Commission, 2009). Actually, we think the surging rejection of Keynesian-type 
                                                           
8 The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook published in October 2010 states: “Fiscal consolidation needs to start 
in earliest 2001. Of utmost importance are firm commitments to ambitious and credible strategies to lower fiscal 
deficits over the medium term […]This task is now more urgent than it was six months ago (IMF, 2010, p. 37)”. 
Similarly, according to the European Commission (2010): “even in countries with lower government debt ratios 
a general consensus view has taken hold that large consolidations are now required to bring fiscal positions back 
on a sustainable path. Although the fiscal stimulus packages were not the main driving factor behind the 
deterioration in fiscal positions – and had probably only a relatively minor impact on fiscal positions - calls for a 
fiscal exit have become stronger (EU, 2010, p. 1)”. 
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policies to be too premature and, above all, theoretically ungrounded. It should more carefully 
consider the real nature of most of the policies implemented after 2007. 
Perhaps more importantly, the financial sector stabilization packages adopted so far have 
proved to be largely useless to restore tranquility on financial markets, as the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis seems to witness. In a way, public intervention in favor of financial 
operators, although unavoidable and necessary, have transformed a prevalently private-agent 
financial dislocation in a public collective problem.  
According to the analytical framework above, let assume that governments issue new T-
bonds in an amount equal to N in exchange of toxic activities in the balance sheet of financial 
operators. Other way round, think new T-bonds issuances to be used to finance 
nationalization programs or public guaranties over risky financial assets. On the one hand, 
these measures can obviously improve balance sheets of financial operators by increasing the 
average market price PP of their private assets and perhaps reducing a bit the perceived 
systemic risk r. On the other hand, however, government help also implies that the burden of 
private agents financial dislocation is now charged on the shoulders of the collectivity at the 
cost of higher public deficits and of an increasing debt/GDP ratio. In such a context, the price 
PG of T-bonds may easily decrease should people start to fear about public finance solidity. T-
bonds of some countries, let say PIIGS countries, may start to be downgraded to junk bonds 
and a sovereign debt problem develop, throwing back the financial system in a worrying 
condition of financial distress. The overall effect of public help on financial sector stability 
turns out to be largely unclear. 
More formally, the first set of derivatives below tries to define the first positive effects that 
public help may produce on financial sector stability by alleviating financial institutions 
insolvencies on their private assets: 
 
P?L?QRL: S = −
TUTAATA
ATV +TUTW TWTV?@/?L < 0  
 
And 
 
P?L?QR0S: = −
TXTAATA
ATV +TXTW TWTV?H/?L < 0  
 
With 
?A?Q > 0, ?E?Q < 0  
In figure 4, such a positive effect is represented by the simultaneous downward movement 
of the two loci for constant values of γ and m. Suppose the economy to rely in point A: the 
ongoing credit contraction is reverted and the basis for a new round of credit expansion and 
economic recovery may be established.  
The two derivatives below, on the contrary, stand for the perverse effects of public 
intervention on financial market stability via excessive public deficits and decreasing T-bond 
prices PG. 
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P?L?QRL: S = −
TUTADTA
DTV?@/?L > 0  
 
And 
 
P?0?QR0: S = −
TXTADTA
DTV?H/?L > 0  
 
With 
?D?Q < 0. 
On the base of equations (10) and (11), lower PG values will move the loci for constant 
values of γ and m up. If these movements are sufficiently strong, i.e. financial operators 
become highly skeptical about public debt solidity, the causes of financial instability will not 
be removed. At the end, the initial positive effect of government intervention to rescue 
financial institutions may be likely displaced and compensated by the negative consequences 
of an emerging public debt crisis. 
 
 
γ 
m 
  A 
 Increase in PP 
and (perhaps) 
reduction in r  
due to public 
financial help 
Back again due to public  
debt sustainability and 
decreasing PG values 
 
Figure 4 – Positive and negative effects of financial system rescue fiscal packages 
 
 
4. A look at the long run: potential growth, public debt sustainability and 
the effects of EU assistance to member countries. 
 
The present worldwide economic context is probably the worst scenario policy-makers 
have to tackle with since the 1929 Great Depression. This seems to be particularly true inside 
the European Union, in which several member states appear to be incapable to 
simultaneously deal with the long-lasting consequences of the 2007 sub-prime crisis and the 
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surging sovereign debt crisis9. On the one side, due to persisting disappointing economic 
performances, most EU member state governments would like to adopt expansionary fiscal 
policies to stimulate aggregate demand and boost economic growth. Such measures, however, 
can hardly be implemented due to the current high concern about public debt sustainability. 
Actually, increasing financial tensions may even worsen the economic environment and make 
any anti-cyclical deficit spending attempt ineffective. On the other side, financial turbulences 
have induced highly indebted EU countries to quickly move from expansionary fiscal stances 
to public balance consolidation in order to restore their own financial credibility. Fiscal 
restrictions, however, likely produce contractionary effects on economic activity and the 
economy may enter in a perverse cycle: economic recovery may stall and set additional strain 
on public balance solidity; a new round of restrictive measures is considered; ultimately, 
economic activity stagnates and decreases even further. 
What we have just described looks like a dramatic no-way-out trap. In such a context, the 
only exit strategy is probably a profound institutional discontinuity. Actually, when economic 
mechanisms prove to be incapable to self-stabilize, changes are to introduce in the 
institutional framework surrounding market processes, in the set of policies implementable 
by economic authorities and in the range of tools at their disposal10. In the last months, 
several proposals have been advanced and some concrete actions already launched. As to the 
proposals, a fierce debate is emerging on the political feasibility and economic  usefulness of 
Eurobond issuances financing anti-cyclical fiscal policies in some EU member countries11. In 
the meanwhile, a EU member state rescue fund has already been created to help countries to 
meet their debt payment needs and, possibly, avoid default.  
In this paper, we don’t want to see in details the technicalities and the institutional-
financial architecture of possible future Eurobond issuances12 nor the existing features of the 
EU member state rescue fund. Rather, we would like to asses in a simple, rough but intuitive 
way the possible macroeconomic consequences of these strategies, perhaps comparing their 
effects on the sustainability of a EU member state public debt and its own growth potential. In 
order to do this, let consider a single EU member state, say one of the so-called PIIGS 
countries. Further, imagine that the two-equation dynamic system below describes the long-
run evolution of its growth rate potential gn and debt-to-GDP ratio d. 
 : = Y,  −                                                                                                                                   (12) 
 
With 
?'?Z < 0 
 
                                                           
9 These difficulties appear particularly relevant for some countries in the European Monetary Union, due to the 
fact they have lost control of monetary policy and do not manage any longer the currency their T-bonds are 
denominated in. According to De Grauwe (2011a), this fact actually put these countries in the same 
uncomfortable situation characterizing several emerging economies in the past.     
10 According to Mayer (2009), it is interesting to note that most advances and progresses in the EU building 
process were realized during periods of deep economic instability and/or political tensions. 
11 See Rodriguez (2010) on the proposal for Eurobond-financed “long-term key investments needed to promote 
the transition to a more low-carbon, knowledge-intensive and inclusive growth model (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 7)”.  
12 See Favero and Missale (2010) on this point and for a discussion of competing proposals as that proposed by 
De Grauwe and Moesen (2009). 
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: = D[ −  = \Z+4][[ −  = \/^[/^ +  −  = ΩZZ +  − ,                                                     (13) 
With Ω = `\^a ; ?Ω?Z < 0 and limZ→NΩ//N = ?Ω/?ZZ)ΩZg = −∞ 13 
 
                                              limZ→j∂Ω//N = ?Ω/?ZZ)ΩZg = ?Ω/lmZ − ΩZg = 0 
 
Equation (12) describes the dynamics of long-run growth potential. It is identical to a 
previous formalization by Lavoie (2006) and is grounded on a growing body of literature on 
the endogenous nature of long-run growth potential (Flaschel, 2000; Leon-Ledesma and 
Thirlwall, 2002). Actually, following Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002), a positive 
relationship seems to connect current economic growth g to the natural growth rate gn. In a 
way, it seems that “growth creates its own resources in the form of increased labor force 
availability and higher productivity of the labor force (Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002, p. 
452)”. Accordingly, in equation (12) we assume long-run growth potential to increase should 
current economic growth be higher than potential growth itself, therefore promoting 
innovations and labor productivity-enhancing technological progress. On the opposite, long-
run growth potential will likely stagnate and decrease should the economy work below its 
full-employment possibilities.  
In equation (12), we assume the debt-to-GDP ratio d to play a role in affecting long-run 
growth dynamics. Actually, we have already stressed that high debt-to-GDP ratios may 
somehow induce reductions in fiscal primary deficits by persuading policy-makers not to 
increase public debt stock (in percentage of GDP) even further. These effects, by curtailing 
demand injections (the difference (G-T) in standard national accounting) may easily dampen 
economic growth. Besides this, high debt-to-GDP ratios may discourage current economic 
growth through several other channels such as increasing country risk premium due to 
uncertain public debt solidity or negative household and firms expectations about future rises 
in taxation and reductions in disposable income. In general, a negative relationship between d, 
g and therefore potential growth dynamics may stand out. This is exactly what we assume.  
As to the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio, equation (13) simply states that the growth 
rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio is nothing but the difference between the growth rate of public 
debt stock (LG/D) and the current economic growth rate g. From an economic point of view, 
equation (13) says that debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics depends on both growth potential gn and 
the debt-to-GDP ratio d itself. The relationship between gn and :  is negative. A higher long-run 
growth potential gn, by feeding current economic expansion g via equation (9), will tend to 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio across time. The effects of the debt-to-GDP ratio on its own 
dynamics, on the contrary, turn out to be uncertain. In equation (13), we assume a high level 
of public debt-to-GDP ratio to induce economic authorities to reduce primary deficit ∆ (or to 
run primary budget surpluses) and therefore to lower the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio Ω as 
well. This fact implies that a stabilizing and negative effect of outstanding debt (as a 
percentage of GDP) on its own dynamics exists. At the same time, however, higher public debt 
                                                           
13 Here we assume the primary deficit ∆ = (G-T) to be generally positive at pretty low values of public debt stock 
d, so that the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio Ω turns out to be positive as well. 
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levels curtail current economic growth, this way alimenting explosive forces. The two 
derivatives below help us to mathematically address this problem.  
 P?'*?Z R'*: S = − ?'/?ZTnTn*)/ = ?'/?Zo/) pqrstruvqrpqrstruvw = x1 + &1 +  + 1y?'?Z                                        (14) 
 
 P?'*?Z RZ: S = − x?Ω/Z/?Z)?'/?Zy)?'/?'* = /+,/+05+67,/+05+67 xNΩ//N − N/Ny                        (15) 
 
Equation (14) defines the slope of the locus for constant values of potential growth gn. The 
sign of equation (14) turns out to be undoubtedly negative, given that N/N < 0. 
Equation (15) gives the slope of the locus for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio. As 
said, its sign is not clear. However, we may generally believe it to be negative at low levels of 
d: the first stabilizing effect will outstrips the explosive one14. At higher values of d, however, 
the initial negative sign of equation (15) likely turns into positive. The first stabilizing effects 
will lose relevance when applied to a considerable public debt stock and the second 
destabilizing one, i.e. (∂g/∂d), prevail. Eventually, what emerges is a U-shaped locus for 
constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Chart 5 below portrays these two loci and the ensuing long-run equilibria when they 
intersect each other:   
 
 d 
  gn 
0=
•
d  
 A 
B 
0=
•
ng  
 
Figure 5 – Multiple long-run equilibria 
 
According to the analysis above, let assume the loci for constant values of g and d intersect 
twice. In this case, two long-run equilibria emerge. Equilibrium A is a “virtuous” locally stable 
equilibrium, in which the economic system presents a high long-run growth potential and 
features a stable low value of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We can say exactly the opposite 
about the perverse equilibrium B, which is characterized by lower long-run growth potential 
and a much higher public debt (as a percentage of GDP). Beside this, equilibrium B shows a 
                                                           
14 Actually, when d is pretty small, slightly higher values of d will reduce Ω and therefore induce a remarkable 
drop in the growth rate of the public debt stock Ω/d. 
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risky unstable saddle-path dynamics. Economic shocks that would temporally bring the 
economy to the right of equilibrium B will likely give rise to disastrous economic processes in 
which declining long-run growth potential and mounting public debt feedback each other and 
lead, soon or later, to dramatic public default episodes. 
On the base of the dynamic system above, it is possible to assess the long-run consequences 
of the financial turbulences described in section 3. Actually, it is easy to see that reductions in 
the effective credit demand (i.e. lower values of parameter γ) and increases of the mark-up 
rate on loans (i.e. rising values of m) may produce disruptive consequences on the whole 
economy. First, we already know that credit crunch and higher m values weaken current 
economic growth and therefore, via equation (12), reduces the long-run growth potential. At 
the same time, through equation (13), they also induce the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase. 
Second, we also remark that the higher is m, the higher will be the interest rate iL on loans and 
the costlier the be debt service (see equation (13)). It is all but a rare phenomenon to see 
increasing interest payments on outstanding debt to trigger a dramatic self-feeding process 
towards default. 
From a graphical perspective, see figure 6, all these mechanisms move the locus for 
constant values of d upward. At the same time, the locus for constant values of gn will move 
down. If sufficiently strong, and this may be the case of financial market panic and “flight to 
safety” sentiments, these movements may induce the two loci not to intersect any longer. 
Long-run equilibria disappear.  
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Figure 6 – Long-run consequences of financial panic 
 
Perhaps more interesting, regardless from the initial positions the economy is, a market-
led run to economic disaster will take place (see arrows associated to points A and B). 
Actually, the financial turbulences of the sub-prime crisis can easily produce destabilizing 
forces in already weak EU member states like Greece. If we assume Greece to be originally 
located in point B, small “complications” on financial markets can be well enough to lead the 
economy towards public debt default and long-run economic stagnation. The same story, 
however, may also take place in much stronger and apparently solid countries like Spain and 
Ireland.  Indeed, before the 2007 crisis, both countries were pretty uniformly considered as 
virtuous countries with sound macroeconomic fundamentals, at least as far as public balance 
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is concerned (De Grauwe, 2011b). In terms of our model, we would have said such economies 
to be placed in a “safe” position like point A. As current events vividly show, however, the 
2007 financial shock has severely affected Spanish and Irish economic activity, and now 
threaten to lead also these countries toward a worrying debt default scenario. This is exactly 
the situation described in figure 6.      
 
4.1. Macroeconomic implications of EU assistance to member states 
 
Once shown the gloomy scenario that may characterize some EU member countries, let’s 
now move to the possible institutional responses. One response, we know, has already been 
implemented and takes the form of the EU member state rescue fund. An alternative perhaps 
additional response is still a possibility and consists in Eurobond issuances.  
As said above, here we do not want to focus on technical and institutional details. Rather, 
we want to analyze the possible macroeconomic outcomes of these two initiatives on the base 
of their different scopes. In this sense, let define the EU-funded member state rescue package 
as an exogenous flow of funds a single member state may dispose of to meet payment 
commitments on the accumulated debt stock. In a way, think at these funds as transfers 
through which debt service costs may be reduced, but which are not directly designed to 
support expansionary fiscal policies. Quite the contrary, assume Eurobonds as financial 
liabilities, perhaps issued by an European Debt Authority and collectively guaranteed by all 
EU member states, in order to help recovery efforts of national governments and finance, say, 
ambitious competitiveness-enhancing public investment programs (Rodriguez, 2010)15. In 
this case, attention is thus on the need to feed economic growth without posing additional 
strain on the EU country-specific fiscal position. In both cases, we take the perspective of the 
single EU member state receiving support by EU institutions, whilst we treat EU help as an 
exogenous variable. Actually, we are well aware that it might be interesting to explicitly 
consider EU into the model through a two-region SFC framework. For the time being however, 
we prefer taking the easier and more immediate way described above, perhaps leaving these 
points to future developments of the present work. 
Let consider the EU member state rescue fund first. Imagine a given amount of resources 
“HF” are channeled from EU institutions towards a EU member state to alleviate its debt 
service costs. From equation (13), the immediate effect of such a help on the member state 
public debt dynamics is pretty clear: the positive entry iL in equation (13) now assumes a 
lower value equal to (iL – HF/D). Public debt management becomes obviously easier and 
possibly moves towards a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Ceteris paribus, from a graphical point of 
view, such a change means the (: = 0) locus to move downward. Beside this, an additional 
positive effect may emerge, should EU financial help ensure financial markets that the 
                                                           
15 It is Keynes himself in chapters 12 and 24 of the General Theory to stress investment as the crucial variable 
anti-cyclical fiscal policies should focus on: “For my own part I am now somewhat skeptical on the success of a 
merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest [and therefore investment]. I expect to 
see the State […] taking an even greater responsibility for directly organizing investment”. Even further: “it 
seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine 
an optimal level of investment. I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment 
will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment”. See also Seccareccia (1995) for 
further details on this issue.  
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supported member state will not go to bankruptcy and payment commitments will be 
respected. This effect may likely emerge in the form of a reduction in the interest rate from iL 
to z (with z < ). Again, the locus for constant values of d will move down. 
Finally, it is pretty hard to define any effect the EU financial support may induce on the 
economic dynamics of the helped member state. Actually, the EU member state rescue 
package does not provide any fund to finance anti-cyclical policies. Quite the opposite, EU 
funds are conceded provided that restrictive fiscal measures are implemented and, possibly, 
primary surpluses achieved. Moreover, the final EU funds transfer from debtor, i.e. the EU 
member state, to creditors may stimulate debtor country’s growth only if these same funds 
are re-spent, for consumption or investment purposes, into the debtor country economy. 
Should the member country creditors mostly be foreign banks, such a demand stimulus would 
likely be very scarce if nil. In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume EU member 
state rescue funds not to have any effect on the helped country current economic activity. 
Accordingly, we will not observe any further movement in the locus for constant values of d 
nor in the locus for constant values of gn. 
The overall picture emerging from such a scenario is portrayed in figure 7.  
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Figure 7 – EU country’s rescue package and long-run dynamics in the assisted economy. 
 
Should a EU member state be in serious troubles as represented by point C, the EU financial 
assistance may be decisive to invert an apparently inexorable run towards public debt default. 
If sufficiently strong, the EU financial help may contribute to stabilize the member state debt-
to-GDP ratio. The member state economy may move from point C to point D, or, even better, to 
point E. In this regard, however, remember that here we do not consider any effect of the EU 
rescue program on the economic dynamics of the supported country. Indeed, neglecting pro-
growth anti-cyclical policies is the main shortcoming of the stabilization measure portrayed in 
figure 7. The debt-to-GDP ratio may well be stabilized and public finance balance put in safety. 
Nevertheless, long-run growth potential will stagnate or even decrease along the adjustment 
process from point C to point E or D, respectively. The situation may be even worse if fiscal 
consolidation conditions should throw the supported economy in a deep recession and, this 
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way, make fiscal stabilization efforts harder. In our mind, this seems to be the case of some EU 
member states like Greece or Portugal. 
Now come to the Eurobond alternative. As suggested above, let simply assume Eurobonds 
as liabilities which are jointly guaranteed by all EU member states and through which 
resources may be channeled towards a specific EU member country to implement pro-growth 
anti-cyclical policies. Define as “HE” the amount of Eurobond-raised resources.              
In our model, such an exogenous help would probably have a double impact on the 
dynamic system at hand. First, current economic growth may recover, this way biding up the 
long-run growth potential of the helped member state. Second, while the effect above will also 
ease public debt management, a further positive effect will emerge due, possibly, to the 
stabilization of financial systems. Actually, Eurobond issuances may help financial institutions 
to acquire a deeper sense of tranquility and believe the Euro project as solid. As a 
consequence, the interest rate iL may decrease and help the assisted country to lower the 
debt-to-GDP ratio without adopting draconian and socially costly restrictive fiscal stances. 
More formally, the first expansionary effect above may be represented by a positive 
relationship between Eurobond-raised resources “HE” and parameter g0 in equation (9). 
Accordingly, equation (12) will be positively affected and the locus for constant values of gn 
move up. This emerges clearly from the derivative below: 
 P?'*?z{R'*: S = − ?'/?z{TnTn*)/ = ?'/?z{o/) pqrstruvqrpqrstruvw = x1 + &1 +  + 1y ` ?'?z{a > 0   
 
With 
?'?z{ > 0.  
At the same time, whilst better growth performances improve by themselves public budget 
solidity, restored financial market tranquility will reduce the interest rate iL. Here, we capture 
this point through a negative relationship between Eurobond–raised funds HE and the interest 
rate iL. Both forces obviously tend to reduce the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio, possibly 
making it negative. Accordingly, the (: = 0) locus will shift downward as indicated by the 
following derivative: 
 P?'*?z{RZ: S = − x?4]/?z{)?'/?z{y)?'/?'* = /+,/+05+67,/+05+67 xN/N|} − N/N|}y  <0 
 
With 
?4]?z{ < 0. 
 The final picture emerging from the Eurobond novelty is reported in figure 8. As in the 
previous case, also the Eurobond solution may bring to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio of the supported country. This is represented by the passage from point C to point F in 
figure 8. Beside this, however, in figure 8 it is also clear the positive impact on long-run 
economic dynamics of the Eurobond-funded investment-based fiscal stimulus. Actually, in our 
model the economic recovery-to-public finance stabilization causal link is the core point 
addressed by Eurobonds. In a way, in the Eurobond scenario, public debt sustainability comes 
and is mainly achieved by means of public stimuli to current economic activity and long-run 
growth potential rather than immediately reducing the burden of debt service costs. 
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Figure 8 – Eurobonds and long-run dynamics in the assisted country 
 
On the base of these considerations, is the Eurobond solution to prefer with respect to the 
EU member state rescue package? The answer, unfortunately, is not that obvious. On the one 
hand, anti-cyclical Eurobond-funded investment projects are powerful measures to support 
economic recovery and, this way, stabilize public finances. On the other hand, the positive 
effects of such policies may take time to emerge. In periods of high financial stress, economic 
agents and financial operators in particular seem never have time enough to wait for these 
positive outcomes to come. Actually, they show a very short-run perspective, so that restoring 
financial tranquility is the first and most urgent problem to solve. In such a context, some sort 
of EU-funded state member bail-out may be necessary to calm wild spirits on financial 
markets and impede the financial and economic disaster portrayed in figure 6. 
The best solution would probably be a mix of both strategies. A immediate EU financial 
help to meet upcoming debt payments may be the early measure to adopt in order to reduce 
tensions on financial markets. This help may be well conceded under the conditions of fiscal 
consolidations in the supported country. Fiscal stabilization, however, may hardly come 
should fiscal consolidation requirements lead the country in a deep recession. To avoid this,  
Eurobonds are the next step. Eurobond-raised resources given to the member country may 
actually be decisive to finance public investment programs, to provide demand injections, 
ultimately to support economic growth. This initiative appears fundamental if we want to 
combine, in the long run, fiscal stabilization with improved growth potential.    
 
 
5. Conclusions           
 
There is no doubt that the economic scenario several economies currently deal with is the 
worst possible since the 1929 Great Depression. Economic activity has barely recovered from 
the 2007 sub-prime meltdown and it is now dramatically jeopardized by mounting financial 
tensions about sovereign debt sustainability. In particular, several EU member states are now 
dangerously swaying between the need of fiscal stimuli to support economic activity and 
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severe fiscal corrections to ensure financial markets about their own public account solidity. 
Problems are so deep as to threaten the existence of the European Monetary Union. 
In this paper we address these hot issues through a post-Keynesian model. Our work 
heavily hinges on some previous post-Keynesian contributions, two papers from Lavoie 
(2006) and Fontana and Setterfield (2009) in particular. Compared to them, here we go a step 
further by analyzing in a dynamic context, in which financial markets beliefs may suddenly 
change, how financial variables, i.e. credit supply and asset prices, endogenously interact each 
other and affect real economy activity. This way, we try to provide a simple formal description 
of the Minskyan financial instability hypothesis. Moreover, we also show why public 
intervention in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis has been largely useless to restore financial 
tranquility and it has transformed a prevalently private debt crisis into a public debt one.   
We conclude our analysis with a look at the long-run. We stress that, in the present context, 
the above financial instability may produce long-lasting economic “dramas” such as 
permanent drops in growth potential and public debt default. In the last months, such a 
scenario has become dramatically concrete in some EU countries, the so-called PIIGS. To avoid 
this awful events to take place, a deep institutional discontinuity is probably needed. A first 
institutional response has already been taken. It consists in a EU member state rescue fund 
providing resources to maintain payment commitments and avoid possible EU countries 
default. An alternative/additional option is the introduction of Eurobonds.  
Both strategies are controversial and present lights and shadows. The EU-funded member 
state rescue program may be preferred as immediate instruments to reduce panic on financial 
markets. The introduction of Eurobonds, in turn, may help to implement Keynesian-type 
expansionary measures, which in the long run are probably the most promising way to 
support economic growth and stabilize helped member countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Moreover, concern exists as to the moral hazard problems EU financial assistance to member 
countries may create by inducing them to forget fiscal discipline and share ensuing bail-out 
costs with other more virtuous member states. In this sense, critics argue, the Stability and 
Growth Treaty (SG) would be irremediably violated by not respecting the no-bail-out clause. 
The Euro-zone would definitely lose its credibility as a stable and sound economic area and its 
political legitimacy weakened16. 
This argument has obviously some ground and it is to consider carefully when elaborating 
the institutional and regulatory framework that will discipline future EU financial help to 
member states. Nevertheless, here we would like to stress to points about the need of a 
deeper EU financial and fiscal integration. First, it is to recognize that a EU member country 
default does not represent a national event any longer, but it will entail communitywide 
negative spill-over at the financial and real-economy level. Such an event, that someone would 
justify and permit by blindly recalling the need to respect existing rules, may eventually 
trigger global consequences much worse that the costs of a EU-funded assistance initiative. 
Beside this, both the EU country rescue package and Eurobonds may strengthen fiscal 
                                                           
16 See Issing (2009) and Kosters (2009) on this point. According to Kosters (2009): “how could the German 
government explain to its citizens that they have to pay for the mismanagement of the governments of other 
EMU countries contrary to the treaties? How will the spending of that money be democratically controlled? 
Bilaterally or by a European institution? (…) the danger of quarrels leading to political tensions is large (Kosters, 
2009, p. 137)”. 
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stability of the supported member states. The macroeconomic soundness of each EU country 
is in turn at the base of the credibility of Eurobond issuances and reduces the risks of new EU-
driven bail-out intervention in the future. In a way, the creation of a “European safety net” 
against member states’ financial troubles may give rise to a self-sustaining virtuous process 
and autonomously eliminate the fear for global instability. Second, it is also to remember that, 
except of Greece, the ongoing crisis is largely due to the 2007 financial meltdown and the 
ensuing financial system rescue packages approved in several EU countries, not to fiscal 
profligacy. Ireland and Spain, for instance, were considered virtuous countries running fiscal 
surpluses and reducing their debt-to-GDP ratios before 2007. Now they are in the eye of the 
storm: a common European response to such unforeseen possibility is to consider. Actually, 
the possible macroeconomic outcomes of such an intervention may be far more desirable than 
any rigorous adequacy to existing rules.      
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